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ON FUZZYFIED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OPERATORS IN GO¨DEL-DUMMETT
LOGIC
NICHOLAS PISCHKE
Abstract. In this paper, we consider the expansion of basic modal Go¨del logic with the notions of public
announcements. Additionally, the public announcement operators are itself fuzzyfied, allowing statements about
relations between the truth-value of a formula and rational constant values as well as various combinations of
these. Following from this, the problems of the classic style of axiomatization of this new logic are discussed and
we investigate the usual reduction-style axioms where we present a work-around for various problems using the
Baaz-∆ and respective constants value formulas as extensions for basic Go¨del logic. For this we show, that this
logic is itself more expressive than our newly introduced one. Finally, we consider the expansion of the fuzzy
public announcement logic itself with the notions of the ∆-operator and rational constants, which resolves the
before presented problems and from which we can provide the usual proof of completeness by reduction.
1. Introduction
Uncertainty and vagueness are essential properties in daily reasoning which come intuitively through per-
sonal and subjective observations and perceptions. The logical laws underlying these concepts dealing with said
properties are therefore undermined with some kind of basic interest for study. One specific approach towards
the notions of vagueness started out by the introduction of the notion of a fuzzy set by Lotfi Zadeh generalizing
the membership properties of elements from a set. Those considerations then gave life to so called fuzzyfications
of many classical aspects of mathematics, including especially the theory of fuzzy logics. In his tremendous
monograph [6], Ha´jek then introduced a meta-mathematical access to fuzzy logics, connecting their semantics
to residuated lattices corresponding to a continuous t-norm. Ha´jeks basic fuzzy logic BL then corresponds
to these logics evaluated over continuous t-norm, while the most prominent examples of t-norm based fuzzy
logic are then respectively associated with the three core t-norms, namely the Go¨del(or minimum), product and
 Lukasiewicz t-norm. The case of the Go¨del t-norm is especially interesting as it corresponds with initial con-
siderations from Kurt Go¨del about the intuitionistic calculus, which where later extensively studied by Dummett.
Another important concept of modeling vagueness in logical realms is represented by the families of modal
logics, covering the notions of necessity and possibility in many different philosophical interpretations, e.g.
modeling temporal factors or epistemic considerations, etc. As introduced by Saul Kripke, the possible world
semantics proved itself to be the most prominent and intuitive model theoretic access to modal logics, being
formally represented by the so called Kripke-frames and Kripke-models over an associated set of worlds where
the elements are called accessible if they are represented by an ordered tuple in a respective accessibility relation.
Each world then proposes different valuations for the propositional variables in discourse.
It may seem intuitive to combine those two notions by considering both fuzzy accessiblity relations as well
as many-valued interpretations for propositional variables. The subject of modal Go¨del logics then arises by
considering those fuzzy Kripke-models which evaluate formulas repsectively by the use of the minumum t-norm
and the associated algebra. One monumental work covering both a logic enriched with a necessity-style op-
erator  and a logic enriched with a possebility-style operator ♦ was developed by Caicedo and Rodriguez
in [2]. Modal expansions of the other core t-norm logics where also considered recently, with especially new
developments concerning the product t-norm. In her Phd-thesis [8], Amanda Vidal then proposed a calculus
for the logic of all left-continuous t-normsMTL(with certain “good“ behavior) enriched with both modal oper-
ators as well as rational constants and the Baaz-∆ operator but limited herself to normal accessibility relations.1
This paper now considers modal Go¨del logics, embedded in a multi-agent epistemic framework, which are
enriched with public announcement operators which itself were fuzzyfied. These operators include relations
between formulas and rational constants expressing propositions about their to-be truth values in certain worlds.
Key words and phrases. fuzzy logic, modal logic, epistemic logic, public announcement logic, Go¨del-Dummett logic.
1This limit was chosen, as Go¨del logic is the only logic where the usual considerations for modal logic hold under fuzzyfied
frames.
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(φ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (φ→ χ)) (BL1)
φ ∧ (φ→ ψ)→ ψ ∧ (ψ → φ) (BL2)
(φ ∧ ψ → χ)→ (φ→ (ψ → ψ)) (BL3a)
(φ→ (ψ → ψ))→ (φ ∧ ψ → χ) (BL3b)
((φ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → φ)→ χ)→ χ) (BL4)
⊥ → φ (BL5)
Figure 1. The axioms for the basic fuzzy-logic BL
This fuzzyfication of public announcements provides an even stronger possibility with reasoning not only about
public communication but also about public conjectures.
1.1. Preliminaries. Initially, basic propositional Go¨del logic G is defined syntactically as the following set of
well formed formulas by the BNF
LG : φ ::= ⊥ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ→ φ)
with p ∈ P being an atomic propositions contained in the associated countably-infinite set. Since, in the case
of Go¨del logic, the strong conjunction & and the weak one ∧ coincide due to the choice of the t-norm, we write
∧ in the general case of the conjunction.
The corresponding algebra used for the semantic evaluations is the standard Go¨del algebra
[0, 1]G = 〈[0, 1], ∗G,⇒G,min,max, 0, 1〉
with ∗G being the Go¨del(or minimum) t-norm, i.e. x ∗G y = min{x, y} and ⇒G being the residuum with
x ⇒G y = 1 for x ≤ y and x ⇒G y = y otherwise. For our set of propositional variables P(sometimes called
V ar) we then define an evaluation function e : P → [0, 1] as the correspondence to the concept of propositional
models. Following to this, we naturally extend an evaluation function e to e′ : LG → [0, 1]
2 which is defined over
formulas with a recursive structure by the Tarski-conditions providing the corresponding algebraic operations
with
e′(p) = e(p) e′(⊥) = 0
e′(φ ∧ ψ) = e′(φ) ∗G e
′(ψ) e′(φ→ ψ) = e′(φ)⇒G e
′(ψ)
An evaluation e′ is called a model for φ, iff e′(φ) = 1. The other common connectives like ¬,↔,∨ are then
internally defined over those connectives, i.e. we write ¬φ := φ→ ⊥, φ↔ ψ := (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ), etc.
For this algebra together with the proposed conditions for evaluations and models, the notions for semantic
consequence are defined similar to the case of normal propositional logic, i.e. for a set of formulas Γ and a
formula φ, φ is a semantic consequence of Γ, Γ |= φ, if for all models e′ with e′(ψ) = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ, we have
that e′(φ) = 1.
The calculus forG which we are referring to is based on the reduced version of the calculus of basic fuzzy logic
BL(shown in Fig. 1) defined by Ha´jek in [6], i.e. the version shortened by all axioms later proved redundant(see
for example [3]) in comparison to Ha´jek original proposal. This BL-calculus gets extended by one specific axiom
for axiomatizing Go¨del logic, the Go¨del axiom (G) : φ→ φ ∧ φ. The only rule for the here called calculus G3 is
modus ponens. Throughout this paper, we will refer to a logic via a bold-font version, i.e. L, to a corresponding
calculus via a serif-font version L and to the underlying language with LL. The notions for provability in this
calculus and throughout this paper are then defined as usual over the use of a chain formulas forming a concrete
proof.
For the case of Go¨del logic, i.e. the standard Go¨del algebra [0, 1]G together with the respective language LG
and the proposed calculus G, general strong standard completeness was initially proven by Dummett in [4].4
Concerning modal Go¨del logic, we mainly refer to the results of Caicedo and Rodriguez in [2]5 where they
2One may more explicitly define e′ with e′ : LG → [0, 1]G
3Referring to G = BL + (G).
4Obviously, the proof by Dummett referred to another calculus and approach different from the later consideration over the
concept of basic fuzzy logic which where later proven to be identical to the result by Dummett.
5The results in this paper we’re circulated years before through different preprint versions, see e.g. [1].
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(φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) (K)
¬¬φ→ ¬¬φ (Z)
From ⊢ φ, infer ⊢ φ (-Nec)
Figure 2. Extensions for the axiomatization of GK-framed models in basic modal Go¨del logic
introduced a semantic definition for Go¨del logic augmented with two modal type operators for general necessity
and possibility, namely  and ♦. As Go¨del logic doesn’t provide an involutive negation in its basic terms,
these modal operators are not classically interdefinable. In this paper, we will only refer to the necessity(or -)
fragment of this language.
Semantically, modal Go¨del logics are evaluated over so called Go¨del-Kripke models, i.e. Kripke models
evaluated over the standard Go¨del algebra, M = 〈W,R, e〉 following Definition 2.1 of the before mentioned
paper, whereW is a non-empty set of worlds or states(sometime referred to as the domain D(M) of the model),
R : W ×W → [0, 1] is a accessibility function and e : W × P → [0, 1] is the basic evaluation function of the
respective model which is evaluated over the standard Go¨del algebra for composed formulas. The substructure
F = 〈W,R〉 is called a Kripke frame respectively. The corresponding extended version of e gets supplemented
by another rule regarding the new modal operator with
e′(w,φ) = inf
w′∈W
{R(w,w′)⇒G e
′(w′, φ)}
Following to the definitions of a multi-world model, we then refer to different notions of satisfiability and validity,
namely local validity, i.e. it holds that e′(w, φ) = 1, written as (M, w) |= φ, the validness of a formula in certain
world of a certain modal; global validity, i.e. it holds that ∀w ∈ W : e′(w, φ) = 1, also written as M |= φ, the
validness in all worlds of a certain modal.
These concept are easily transferred to a multi-agent context, invoking a non-empty set of agents A. Each
of those agents is then associated with an indexed necessity-style operator and an indexed version of its own
accessibility function called ra. We then refer to the set of all accessibility functions as R = {ra : W ×W →
[0, 1] | a ∈ A}.
Similar to classical modal logics, we can consider different classes of frames categorized through restrictions
on their accessibility relations. These fuzzy versions of the usual systems like e.g. S4 and S5 are then respec-
tively denoted with GS4, GS5, etc. Throughout this paper, we will still only consider the basic class of all
multi-agent Go¨del-Kripke models, i.e. GK.
This class is then strongly standard complete axiomatized by the extension of the above presented system
for Go¨del logic with the the axioms and rules presented in Fig. 2, as proven by the authors of the above paper
in Theorem 4.2.
It may also be noted for later considerations that we denote the set of subformulas of a given formula φ
with Sub(φ), while it is constructed over the usual decomposition of the formula using the given BNF of the
language.
2. A rational fuzzyfied public announcement operator
Building up on the results in [2] about Go¨del modal logic, we’re now transferring the idea of public announce-
ment to Go¨del logic either, creating a fuzzy analogon to the logic PA. As said before, we will write Ka in the
case of a necessity-style agent-indexed operator in contrast to a to emphasize the epistemic context. The
corresponding set of agents is called A in this context. This new logic, called FPA, is here defined syntactically
over the following BNF with
LFPA : φ ::= ⊥ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ→ φ) | Kaφ | [λ]φ
where we have
λ ::= (V (ψ) = c) | (V (ψ) > c) | (λ ∧ λ) | (λ→ λ) | Kaλ | [λ]λ
for the term inside the announcement operator [ ] with ψ ∈ LFPA and c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. Parentheses are omitted
if the context is clear as it was done before. As it can be seen, the usual public announcement operator got
fuzzyfied by publicly announcing rational relations between a certain formula ψ and a value constant c. These
core value-formulas can be combined using the usual connectives to create a formulas making a fuzzy restriction
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on the models. This whole set of well-formed value-formulas is labeled with LFPAV .
The semantics of this new logic are again defined over the relational Kripkean semantics of fuzzy modal Go¨del
logic, i.e. we’re using the same frame/model definitions as provided in the preliminaries, again defined over an
augmented Go¨del algebra for the evaluation of composed formulas in a specific world. Therefore, the extended
evaluation function e′ gets supplemented by another rule for composed formulas which provides handling for
the new operator with
e′M(w, [λ]φ) =
{
e′
M|λ(w, φ) iff w ∈ D(M|λ)
1 otherwise
where M is an arbitrary model and w ∈ D(M). The model M|λ and the corresponding extended evaluation
function mentioned in the before definition derives from the original restricted model idea of basic PA by the
following Def. 1.
Definition 1. A FPA-model M restricted by the valuation-formula λ, written M|λ = 〈Wλ, Rλ, eλ〉, is defined
with
Wλ = {w ∈W | e
′(w, λ) = 1}
Rλ = {r
λ
a :Wλ ×Wλ → [0, 1] | a ∈ A} where r
λ
a (w, v) = ra(w, v) for all w, v ∈Wλ
e′λ :Wλ × P → [0, 1] where e
′
λ(w, p) = e
′(w, p) for all w ∈Wλ, p ∈ P
We again augment the rules for the extension e′ with the following two rules to handle the core value-formulas
as enforced by the definitions of the restrictions for the set of worlds Wλ in Def. 1.
e′(w, V (ψ) = c) =
{
1 iff e′(w,ψ) = c
0 otherwise
e′(w, V (ψ) > c) =
{
1 iff e′(w,ψ) > c
0 otherwise
From these definitions, the core valuation-formulas and by that all composite versions λ being possible for the
announcement operators are possible to get evaluated in a certain world, making it also possible to create the
restricted set of worlds according to the definition. Note, that the core value-formulas and therefore all possible
compositions only take discrete boolean values. For the other common relations between the real values in the
discourse like ≥ etc., we use the following abbreviations:
V (φ) 6= c := ¬(V (φ) = c) V (φ) ≤ c := ¬(V (φ) > c)
V (φ) ≥ c := (V (φ) = c) ∨ (V (φ) > c) V (φ) < c := ¬(V (φ) ≥ c)
After these considerations for the basic semantics of FPA, we find, that the usual reduction axioms seem to
be valid in the fuzzy realm as well, as it follows from Prop. 1. The problem with these valid sentences is
that not all6 are well-formed with respect to the conditions made for FPA before in the corresponding BNFs.7
We still pseudo-assign a truth value for these sentences, to show that they should be valid in a more meta-
perceptional sense. This is only possible, since, although they are not well-formed, they don’t provide some
mere syntactical error but instead use the value-formulas in an unintended sense, still following the other rules
made for well-formedness.
Proposition 1. The following sentences appear to be valid in all FPA-models over GK-frames:
(i): [λ]p↔ (λ→ p) (ii): [λ]⊥ ↔ (λ→ ⊥)
(iii): [λ](φ ∧ ψ)↔ ([λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ) (iv): [λ](φ→ ψ)↔ ([λ]φ→ [λ]ψ)
(v): [λ]Kaφ↔ (λ→ Ka[λ]φ) (vi): [λ][µ]φ↔ [λ ∧ [λ]µ]φ
Proof. Since all value-formulas either evaluate to 0 or 1, we split the proof into two parts, (a) considering
e′(w, λ) = 1 and (b) considering e′(w, λ) = 0 for an arbitrary world w in an arbitrary model M. If e′ is not
subscripted, it is assumed that it referrers to this original model. Obviously, the whole proof is carried out in a
hypothetical sense.
(i): For (a), we have e′(w, [λ]p) = e′
M|λ(w, p) since w ∈ D(M|λ), i.e. being equal to e
′(w, p). On the other side,
we have e′(w, λ→ p) = e′(w, p) from the semantics of →. Presuming (b), we have e′(w, [λ]p) = 1 per definition
as w 6∈ D(M|λ). Considering the righthand side, we also derive e′(w, λ→ p) = 1 as for every value e′(w, p), we
have 0 ≤ e′(w, p).
6More specific: (i), (ii) and (v).
7Which is why it is referred to them as sentences, not formulas.
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(ii): Supposing (a), we then evaluate e′(w, [λ]⊥) = e′
M|λ(w,⊥) = 0. For the righthand side, we have by
presuming (a) that e′(w, λ → ⊥) = e′(w,⊥) = 0. Now supposing (b), we derive e′(w, [λ]⊥) = 1 per definition
while we also get e′(w, λ→ ⊥) = 1 from the semantics of →.
(iii): Presuming (a), we have e′(w, [λ](φ ∧ ψ)) = e′
M|λ(w, φ ∧ ψ), i.e. e
′
M|λ(w, φ) ∗G e
′
M|λ(w,ψ) by the se-
mantics of ∧. This is similar to e′(w, [λ]φ) ∗G e′(w, [λ]ψ), i.e. e′(w, [λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ). Supposing (b), we derive
e′(w, [λ](φ ∧ ψ)) = e′(w, [λ]φ) = e′(w, [λ]ψ) = 1 and therefore e′(w, [λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ) = 1.
(iv): The proof is similar to the proof of (iii), replacing ∧ with → and therefore ∗G with ⇒G.
(v): Suppose initially that (b), therefore we have e′(w, [λ]Kaφ) = e
′(w, λ → Ka[λ]φ) = 1 by definition of
→ and []. Now suppose on the other hand that (a). Thus, we have e′(w, [λ]Kaφ) = e′M|λ(w,Kaφ) and
e′(w, λ → Ka[λ]φ) = e′(w,Ka[λ]φ). By the definition of the modal necessity operator presented before,
we write infw′∈Wλ{r
λ
a(w,w
′) ⇒G e′λ(w,Kaφ)} for the first and infw′∈W {ra(w,w
′) ⇒G e′(w, [λ]φ)} for the
second. For this second statement, we again presume first that e′(w′, λ) = 1. Therefore, we infer that
e′(w′, [λ]φ) = e′λ(w
′, φ) and thus (ra(w,w
′) ⇒G e′(w′, [λ]φ)) = (rλa (w,w
′) ⇒G e′λ(w
′, φ)) since ra and r
λ
a
are equal in contained worlds. Now, if we have e′(w′, λ) = 0 on the other hand for some world w′, we
then infer e′(w′, [λ]φ) = 1, i.e. ra(w,w
′) ⇒G e′(w′, [λ]φ) = 1 by the definition of ⇒G. Now since we have
w′ 6∈ Wλ per definition, the first infimum doesn’t contain them, i.e. all values not associated with the subset
Wλ evaluate to 1 in this scenario. Therefore, every smaller or equal value is contained in both evaluations.
Additionally, as shown in the first presumption, we also have a 1-evaluation if Wλ = ∅. Thus, we have
infw′∈Wλ{r
λ
a (w,w
′)⇒G e′λ(w,Kaφ)} = infw′∈W {ra(w,w
′)⇒G e′(w, [λ]φ)}.
(vi): For this formula, it suffices to show that the two restricted models M|(λ ∧ [λ]µ) and (M|λ)|µ are iso-
morphic to each other. As both, the restricted version of e and R only depend on the restricted set W ′, we
simply show that W is similar for both restricted models. Therefore, suppose that w ∈ D(M|λ ∧ [λ]µ). Thus
e′(w, λ ∧ [λ]µ) = 1, i.e. e′(w, λ) = 1 and e′(w, [λ]µ) = 1 by the semantics of ∧. From the first one, we infer
w ∈ D(M|λ) while we derive e′
M|λ(w, µ) = 1 from both of them together. From these two statements, we infer
w ∈ D((M|λ)|µ). The fact that w was arbitrary completes the proof. 
Apparently, the typical reduction formulas (at least should) maintain their truth in this new context but since
not all of them follow the proposed definitions for well-formed formulas we’re not able to provide a classical,
reduction style axiomatic system. For avoiding these syntactical errors, we propose a second approach to these
concepts by incorporating the Baaz-Monteiro operator ∆ as well as rational constants. It will then be shown
that it is possible to create adequate translations for the valuation formulas using these notions.
3. Similar expressions for value formulas using the Delta-operator and constants
In this section, we provide the groundwork on the before presented idea of expressing the valuation formulas
through augmentation of the core language by the ∆-operator as well as with rational constants. The here
introduced logic K∆(Q) is then later proved to be even more expressive than our logic FPA.
3.1. Preliminaries for the new notions. The Baaz-operator ∆ follows the form of a unary connective with
the following truth-function δ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] defined over
δ(x) =
{
1 iff x = 1
0 otherwise
extending the Tarski-conditions for our logic with e′(∆φ) = δ(e′(φ)). This additionally yields the standard
G∆-algebra by augmenting the standard G-algebra with the truth function δ for the additional operator.
Additionally we’re considering the enrichment of this ∆-Go¨del logic with the notions of truth-constants for
each rational c ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. Following the results and definitions in [5], we consider the rational subalgebra
of [0, 1]G(in the following simply denoted by Q) as the corresponding algebraic notion for the new formulas.
We denote this new logic with G∆(Q). Now, considering the language, we simply introduce a constant value
formula c¯ for each c ∈ Q ∩ (0, 1).8 Obviously, for the extended evaluation function, we simply consider the
augmentation with the rule e′(c¯) = c in correspondence with the algebraic counterpart following Definition 4.2
8The constants 0¯ and 1¯ are excluded from this linguistic considerations as they are associated with the formulas ⊥ and ⊤
respectively.
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of [5].9 For the corresponding axiomatic system G∆(Q), we consider the axiomatic extension of G with the
following axioms
(BK1): c¯ ∧ d¯↔ c ∗g d (BK2): c¯→ d¯↔ c⇒G d
(∆1) ∆φ ∨ ¬∆φ (∆2) ∆(φ ∨ ψ)→ ∆φ ∨∆ψ
(∆3) ∆φ→ φ (∆4) ∆φ→ ∆∆φ
(∆5) ∆(φ→ ψ)→ (∆φ→ ∆ψ) (∆C): ∆c¯↔ δ(c)
together with the ∆-necessitation rule (∆−Nec) : From φ, infer ∆φ. As shown in Corollary 8.9 from [5], the
logic G∆(Q) together with the calculus G∆(Q) also enjoys the strong standard completeness with respect to
the algebraic counterpart as a combination of the standard G∆-algebra and the algebra for G(Q).
3.2. Augmentation by the modal K-operator. The logic G∆(Q) presented before gets now additionally
extended with the modal necessity operator Ka. We call this new logic K∆(Q), which language is defined over
the following BNF.
LK∆(Q) : φ ::= ⊥ | c¯ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ→ φ) | ∆φ | Kaφ
The semantics of this logic are again defined similar as before by the frame/model definitions given for the basic
Ka-logic, while the models are now obviously defined over the Go¨del-algebra extended with the notions of the
∆-operator and the constant value formulas c¯ for their contained extended evaluation function.
Although it is not in the scope of this paper, there are still some conjectures to make about the axiomatic
system for K∆(Q) as it may consist about the before presented axioms and rules for the sole ∆-operator and
constants together with additional axioms for interplay with the Ka-operator. For this, we may use axioms
proposed in [8] for the calculus of left-continuous t-norms accepting a conjunctive axiomatization over crisp
frames like
∆Kaφ→ Ka∆φ
Ka(c¯→ φ)↔ (c¯→ Kaφ)
which appear to be valid in the many-valued frame context either.
In the logicK∆(Q), it is now possible to provide corresponding formulas to the before presented core valuation-
formulas over the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The following formulas φ ∈ LK∆(Q) are similar to the core valuation formulas V (ψ) = c and
V (ψ) > c respectively.
(i): ∆(ψ ↔ c¯) is similar to V (ψ) = c for all possible values of ψ and c¯
(ii): ¬∆(ψ → c¯) is similar to V (ψ) > c for all possible values of ψ and c¯
Proof. We split the proof of both equivalences in two parts, namely (a) e′(ψ)◦c and (b) e′(ψ) 6 ◦c for an arbitrary
model M containing e and with ◦ here representing the respective algebraic relations.
(i): For (a), we obviously have e′(w, V (ψ) = c) = 1 per definition while for (b), we derive e′(w, V (ψ) = c) = 0.
Now considering the corresponding formula using constants and the ∆-operator, we have e′(w,ψ ↔ c¯) = 1 iff
e′(w,ψ) = e′(c¯), i.e. if (a) is presumed, and e′(w,ψ ↔ c¯) < 1 otherwise per the definition of the semantics of
↔. From this, we have e′(w,∆(ψ ↔ c¯)) = 1 iff e′(w,ψ) = e′(w, c¯), i.e. e′(w,ψ) = c, and e′(w,∆(ψ ↔ c¯)) = 0
otherwise per definition of ∆.
(ii): Presuming (a), we obviously have e′(w, V (ψ) > c) = 1 per definition and again presuming (b), i.e.
e′(w,ψ) ≤ c, we have e′(w, V (ψ) > c) = 0. Now considering the semantics of → through the corresponding
function ⇒G, we have e
′(w,ψ → c¯) = 1 only if e′(w,ψ) ≤ c and e′(w,ψ → c¯) < 1 otherwise. Using the
∆-operator, we derive that e′(w,∆(ψ → c¯)) = 1 only if e′(w,ψ) ≤ c and e′(w,∆(ψ → c¯)) = 0 iff e′(w,ψ) > c.
Using ¬, we provide an exchange of premises. 
Taking these translations for the core valuation formulas, we now consider the following complete translation,
providing the main part of the proof of one of the main theorems of this paper.
Theorem 1. K∆(Q) is more expressive than FPA.
9As this is not in the direct scope of this paper, we will not dive too hard into the algebraic notions.
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Proof. The proof is established over a translation system with a function t : LFPA ∪ LFPAV → LK∆(Q) by the
following recursive definition.
t(⊥) = ⊥ t(p) = p
t(φ ∧ ψ) = t(φ) ∧ t(ψ) t(φ→ ψ) = t(φ)→ t(ψ)
t(Kaφ) = Kat(φ) t([λ]⊥) = t(λ→ ⊥)
t([λ]p) = t(λ→ p) t([λ](φ ∧ ψ)) = t([λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ)
t([λ](φ→ ψ)) = t([λ]φ→ [λ]ψ) t([λ]Kaφ) = t(λ→ Ka[λ]φ)
t([λ][µ]φ) = t([λ ∧ [λ]µ]φ)
t(V (φ) > c) = ¬∆(t(φ)→ c¯) t(V (φ) = c) = ∆(t(φ)↔ c¯)
Eventually eliminating all announcements, we find for each φ ∈ LFPA, that t(φ) ∈ LK∆(Q). Therefore, K∆(Q)
is not less expressive than FPA. Since this translation can not be established for the inverse direction as
there is no direct representative for the formulas created by the ∆-operator and the constants outside of the
announcement operators, we find that FPA is not equally expressive to K∆(Q) either. The validness of these
translations was established before trough Prop. 1 together with Prop. 2. 
4. Expanding FPA with the ∆-operator and constants
Although it was not possible to provide a reduction-style axiomatic system for the simple version of our
new logic FPA, we still showed that basic Go¨del logic extended with the ∆-operator and rational constants
can express these statements and even that it is expressively stronger. This immediately leads to considering
FPA enriched with the notion of constants and the Baaz-operator as the classical reduction axioms would be
expressible as well formed formulas. We define the language of FPA∆(Q) over the following BNF
LFPA∆(Q) : φ ::= ⊥ | c¯ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ→ φ) | ∆φ | Kaφ | [λ]φ
where we have an equal styled definition for λ-formulas, adding the new introduced operator.10 Additionally,
we don’t allow plain constants outside of the valuation formulas similar to the basic propositional variables.
By now considering the before provided preliminaries and notions for the different components, this leads to
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The following formulas are valid in all FPA∆(Q)-models with GK-frames.
[λ]⊥ ↔ (λ→ ⊥) [λ]p↔ (λ→ p)
[λ](φ ∧ ψ)↔ ([λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ) [λ](φ→ ψ)↔ ([λ]φ→ [λ]ψ)
[λ]Kaφ↔ (λ→ Ka[λ]φ) [λ][µ]φ↔ [λ ∧ [λ]µ]φ
[λ]∆φ↔ (λ→ ∆[λ]φ) [λ]c¯↔ (λ→ c¯)
Proof. The proof of the first six formulas is similar to the (pseudo-)proof of Prop. 1. We now consider the two
additional ones regarding the ∆ operator and constants. We assume the same presumptions as in the before
referenced proposition. The case regarding e′(w, λ) = 0 is left out since it should be obvious.
Suppose that e′(w, λ) = 1, therefore we have e′(w, [λ]∆φ) = e′λ(w,∆φ). By the definition of ∆, this trans-
lates to δ(e′λ(w, φ)). Considering the righthand side, we first derive e
′(w, λ → ∆[λ]φ) = e′(w,∆[λ]φ). By
the definition of ∆ again, we have that δ(e′(w, [λ]φ)). Since we presumed that e′(w, λ) = 1, we then have
δ(e′(w, [λ]φ)) = δ(e′λ(w, φ)) since w ∈Wλ.
Now considering the second equivalency, we again presume that e′(w, λ) = 1. Thus, we have e′(w, [λ]c¯) =
e′λ(w, c¯) = r. Now, for the righthand side, we get e
′(w, λ→ c¯) = e′(w, c¯) = r. 
Using the equivalences of the section before, we can now provide the well-formedness trough the adequate
translation of the atomic value-formulas into their above presented correspondings to which they only serve as
labels anymore. Additionally, we still had to introduce two reduction axioms for the newly introduced parts
of the language. From these reductions, we now provide a proof system for our logic FPA∆(Q) shown in Fig.
3. This proof system builds on the before mentioned still to-happen axiomatization for K∆(Q). As this is not
in the scope of this paper, we will continue the proofs in a conditionalized manner. Before proceeding to the
second main theorem, we additionally provide the soundness of the system FPA∆(Q) over the corresponding
fuzzy Kripke-models.
10The ∆-operator results in being superfluous for the expressivity of the logic as the value formulas follow the discrete boolean
values.
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The axioms and rules of the K∆(Q)-calculus
[λ]⊥ ↔ (λ→ ⊥) (PA1)
[λ]p↔ (λ→ p) (PA2)
[λ](φ ∧ ψ)↔ ([λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ) (PA3)
[λ](φ→ ψ)↔ ([λ]φ→ [λ]ψ) (PA4)
[λ]Kaφ↔ (λ→ Ka[λ]φ) (PA5)
[λ][µ]φ↔ [λ ∧ [λ]µ]φ (PA6)
[λ]∆φ↔ (λ→ ∆[λ]φ) (PA7)
[λ]c¯↔ (λ→ c¯) (PA8)
From φ, φ→ ψ, infer ψ (MP)
From φ, infer ∆φ (∆-Nec)
From ⊢ φ, infer ⊢ Kaφ (K-Nec)
Figure 3. The system FPAL∆(Q)
Lemma 1 (Soundness). The system FPA∆(Q) is sound with respect to the class of FPA∆(Q)-models with
GK-frames, assuming that K∆(Q) is sound axiomatized by a system K∆(Q).
Proof. This lemma follows directly from Prop. 3 establishing the validity of all the remaining axioms not
contained in the subsystem K∆(Q). As all K∆(Q)-models are captured in FPA∆(Q)-models as well, we find
that the subsystem K∆(Q) is sound with respect to all FPA∆(Q)-models either. 
4.1. Completeness by reduction. For now proving completeness for the logic FPA∆(Q), we consider a
similar translation as used in the proof of Thm. 1 extended by the notions for the ∆-operator and our rational
constants.
Definition 2. The new translation t : LFPA∆(Q) → LK∆(Q)
11 is defined recursively as follows:
t(⊥) = ⊥ t(p) = p
t(φ ∧ ψ) = t(φ) ∧ t(ψ) t(φ→ ψ) = t(φ)→ t(ψ)
t(Kaφ) = Kat(φ) t(∆φ) = ∆t(φ)
t(c¯) = c¯
t([λ]⊥) = t(λ→ ⊥) t([λ]p) = t(λ→ p)
t([λ](φ ∧ ψ)) = t([λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ) t([λ](φ→ ψ)) = t([λ]φ→ [λ]ψ)
t([λ]Kaφ) = t(λ→ Ka[λ]φ) t([λ][µ]φ) = t([λ ∧ [λ]µ]φ)
t([λ]∆φ) = t(λ→ ∆[λ]φ) t([λ]c¯) = t(λ→ c¯)
Note, that the translations for the atomic value-formulas are no longer needed as they now only serve as
abbreviations anymore. Following the usual process of proving completeness by reduction, we now first establish
a complexity measure suitable for providing the necessary properties for some later propositions.
Definition 3. The complexity measure c : LFPA∆(Q) → N is defined over the following inductive rules:
c(p) = c(c¯) = c(⊥) = 1
c(φ→ ψ) = c(φ ∧ ψ) = 1 +max{c(φ), c(ψ)}
c(Kaφ) = c(∆φ) = 1 + c(φ)
c([λ]φ) = (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(φ)
Following the proof concept presented in e.g. [7], this complexity measure now provides some useful properties
needed for the last steps in advancing the completeness theorem.
11Since there is no upcoming reference to the old translation used for providing expressivity comparisons, we reuse the letter t
as a name.
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Lemma 2. The following properties hold for the complexity measure defined in Def. 3 for all φ, ψ ∈ LFPA∆(Q):
(i): c(φ) ≥ c(ψ) if ψ ∈ Sub(φ) (ii): c([φ]p) > c(φ→ p)
(iii): c([φ]c¯) > c(φ→ c¯) (iv): c([φ]⊥) > c(φ→ ⊥)
(v): c([λ](φ→ ψ)) > c([λ]φ→ [λ]ψ) (vi): c([λ](φ ∧ ψ)) > c([λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ)
(vii): c([λ]Kaφ) > c(λ→ Ka[λ]φ) (viii): c([λ]∆φ) > c(λ→ ∆[λ]φ)
(ix): c([λ][µ]φ) > c([λ ∧ [λ]µ]φ)
Proof. (i): The proof is established over induction on the structure of the formula φ:
(IB): We divide the base case in two possibilities, i.e. φ = p, φ = c¯ and φ = ⊥: We have c(p) = 1, c(⊥) = 1,
c(c¯) = 1 and Sub(p) = {p}, Sub(⊥) = {⊥}, Sub(c¯) = {c¯}, i.e. we find that we only have the case of c(p) ≥ c(p),
c(⊥) ≥ c(⊥), c(c¯) ≥ c(c¯) for a propositional variable, c¯ and ⊥.
The induction hypothesis is then established over the to proof part of the lemma.
(IH): For all formulas φ, we have c(φ) ≥ c(φs) for all φs ∈ Sub(φ).
For the induction step, we consider the other possible structures of the formula φ following the BNF-defined
language.
(IS): We consider the following cases: (a): φ = ψ ∧ χ, (b): φ = ψ → χ, (c): φ = ∆ψ, (d): φ = Kaψ and (e):
φ = [λ]ψ.
(a): We find that for a φs ∈ Sub(φ), we have either φs = ψ∧χ or φs ∈ Sub(ψ) or φs ∈ Sub(χ). For the former
one, we find that c(ψ ∧ χ) ≥ c(ψ ∧ χ). For the latter ones, we first consider c(ψ ∧ χ) = 1 + max{c(ψ), c(χ)}.
Now, by the induction hypothesis, we find that for all ψs ∈ Sub(ψ) that c(ψ) ≥ c(ψs) and the similar for
χ. By that, it is simple to see by the arithmetic of max, that we have 1 + max{c(ψ), c(χ)} ≥ c(ψs) and
1 + max{c(ψ), c(χ)} ≥ c(χs), i.e. 1 + max{c(ψ), c(χ)} ≥ c(φs).
(b): The case is completely similar to the one of (a), replacing all occurrences of ∧ with →.
(c): We again consider that we have either φs = ∆ψ or φs ∈ Sub(ψ). As the first one is quite obvious, we
again first consider for the second one, that c(∆ψ) = 1+ c(ψ). Now, considering the induction hypothesis with
c(ψ) ≥ c(ψs), we find that 1 + c(ψ) ≥ φs as we have φs = ψs for the latter for some subformula of ψ.
(d): The case is completely similar to the one of (c), replacing all occurrences of ∆ with Ka.
(e): Consider again that either φs = [λ]ψ or φs ∈ Sub(λ) ∪ Sub(ψ). Now, as the former is again quite
obvious, we now consider, that c([λ]ψ) = (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(ψ). By the induction hypothesis, we again either find
that (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(ψ) ≥ c(λs) or (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(ψ) ≥ c(ψs), i.e. that (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(ψ) ≥ c(φs).
(ii): Consider c([λ]p) = (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(p) = 4 + c(λ) and c(λ→ p) = 1 +max{c(λ), c(p)}. Since we always have
c(λ) ≥ c(p) for composite formulas, we derive 1 + c(λ) for the second expression, therefore 4 + c(λ) > 1 + c(λ),
i.e. c([φ]p) > c(φ→ p).
(iii), (iv): The proof is similar to (ii).
(v): First consider c([λ](φ∧ψ)) = (4+ c(λ))∗ (1+max{c(φ), c(ψ)}), i.e. 4+ c(λ)+max{c(φ), c(ψ)} ∗ (4+ c(λ)).
Similarly, consider c([λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ) = 1 +max{c([λ]φ), c([λ]ψ)}, i.e. 1 + max{(4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(φ), (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(ψ)}.
By the laws of max, we derive 1+max{c(φ), c(ψ)}∗ (4+c(λ)). Thus, it immediately follows that c([λ](φ∧ψ)) >
c([λ]φ ∧ [λ]ψ).
(vi): The proof is similar to (v).
(vii): On the one hand, consider c([λ]Kaφ) = (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(Kaφ), i.e. (4 + c(λ)) ∗ (1 + c(φ)). Expanding
the product, we have 4 + 4c(φ) + c(λ)c(φ) + c(λ), i.e. 4 + c(λ) + c(φ) ∗ (4 + c(λ)). Now considering the second
part, we have c(λ → Ka[λ]φ) = 1 + max{c(λ), c(Ka[λ]φ)}, i.e. 1 + max{c(λ), 1 + (4 + c(λ))c(φ)}. Since we
clearly always have c(λ) < 1 + (4+ c(λ))c(φ), we have 1 + 1+ 4c(φ) + c(λ)c(φ), i.e. 2 + c(φ) ∗ (4 + c(λ)). Thus,
c([λ]Kaφ) > c(λ→ Ka[λ]φ).
(viii): The proof is similar to (vii).
(ix): For the one side, consider c([λ][µ]φ) = (4+c(λ))∗(4+c(µ))∗c(φ). For other part of the inequality, consider
c([λ∧λ]µ]φ) = (4+1+max{c(λ), (4+c(λ))∗c(µ)})∗c(φ). This is equal to c(φ)∗(5+c(µ)∗(4+c(λ))) by considering
that we always have c(λ) < (4 + c(λ)) ∗ c(µ). From this, one can clearly see that c([λ][µ]φ) > c([λ ∧ λ]µ]φ). 
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We’re now following the usual fashion and now provide the lemma establishing the provable equivalency for
a formula and its translation.
Lemma 3. For every formulas φ ∈ LFPA∆(Q), it holds that ⊢FPA∆(Q) φ↔ t(φ).
Proof. By establishing an induction over the complexity measure, it can be easily shown that for every finite
complexity of a formula, its translation is provable as it relates to the properties of a typical subformula, using
Lem. 2 and Prop. 3. 
From this lemma, we’re now able to provide the completeness theorem for our extended versions of FPA
through the reduction axioms. Additionally, by induction on the complexity of a formula, it may be shown that
for each φ ∈ LFPA∆(Q), we have t(φ) ∈ LK∆(Q).
Theorem 2 (Completeness). The system FPA∆(Q) is strong standard complete with respect to all GK-framed
FPA∆(Q)-models, assuming a strong standard complete axiomatization for K∆(Q) called K∆(Q).
Proof. Taking an arbitrary theory Γ and an arbitrary formula φ, suppose that Γ |= φ(with respect to the
before mentioned model class). Since ⊢FPA∆(Q) φ ↔ t(φ) and the soundness of the system established in
Lem. 1, we find that Γ |= t(φ). Now, the formula t(φ) doesn’t contain any public announcement operators,
i.e. t(φ) ∈ LK∆(Q). Therefore, we have that Γ ⊢K∆(Q) t(φ). Since K∆(Q) is a subsystem of FPA∆(Q), we
additionally find that Γ ⊢FPA∆(Q) t(φ). Now again from ⊢FPA∆(Q) φ↔ t(φ), it follows that Γ ⊢FPA∆(Q) φ. 
Corollary 1. FPA∆(Q) is equally expressive as K∆(Q).
Remark 1. The corollary follows not solely from the completeness theorem but from the proof including the
before presented lemmas and definitions of the translation.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the notions of fuzzy public announcement operators evaluated over the standard
Go¨del-algebra. These fuzzy relations inside the announcements could then relate a formula and its truth degree
in the respective worlds to a rational constant. For this new provided logic FPA, we then considered expressivity
comparisions with the augmented Go¨del logicK∆(Q), i.e. the logic extending basic Go¨del logic with the notions
of the Baaz-Delta, rational constants and a necessity-style modal operator Ka for a set of agents A. It was then
shown that this augmented Go¨del logic is itself more expressive than FPA. The choice for rational constants
was here made for easy axiomatization of this corresponding logic using constants as it doesn’t require the
language to be uncoutable. The introduction of real constants for the open unit interval is left for future work,
as together with the uncountability there may be other additional issues occuring. The logic FPA itself is left
unaxiomatized for future work following the presented problems regarding the somewhat standard process of
reduction-styled axioms. Since an augmentation with the ∆-operator and truth constants of FPA itself resolves
the issues around the typical reduction axioms, we then provided a strong completeness theorem for this logic
over the reduction to the before shown corresponding logic K∆(Q), assuming a still to-provide axiomatization
for K∆(Q).
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